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LAND ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS:
EGBA LAND AND SLAVERY, 1830-1914.
JAMES FENSKE†
Abstract. The “land abundance” view of African history uses sparse population to explain
economic institutions. I provide supporting evidence from the Egba of Nigeria. I use early
colonial court records to show that Egba institutions fit the theory’s predictions. Before 1914,
the Egba had poorly defined land rights, practiced extensive agriculture, relied on dependant
and forced labor, and used labor to secure loans. There are two major exceptions. First, the
Egba sold some land. Second, land disputes existed. These are explained by land scarcity when
the Egba initially arrived at Abeokuta and by heterogeneity in the quality of land.
1. Introduction
According to the “land abundance” view of African history, the continent’s economic institu-
tions before colonial rule were decisively shaped by its sparse population (Austin, 2008, 2009;
Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). With land freely available, land markets were undeveloped and
rights were rarely permanent or individual. Wage labor was absent, since potential farmers
could work on their own accounts. Instead, slaves, wives and dependants were the principal
sources of labor. Because land had no value as collateral, credit markets were characterized
by high interest rates, and human pawns were used to secure loans. In this paper, I support
this view by using it to explain both institutions and institutional change among the Egba of
southwestern Nigeria over the period 1930 to 1914.
Institutions are understood to be major causes of Africa’s successes as well as its failures, and
are a major cause of African poverty (e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2003)). While many recent studies
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have focused on the importance of colonial institutions and investments (Bolt and Bezemer,
2009; Huillery, 2009), it is clear that pre-colonial institutions limited the choices available to
colonial powers. These institutions have endured or evolved, and continue to affect outcomes
in the present (Bezemer et al., 2009; Englebert, 2000; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007). Explaining
these institutions, then, helps explain Africa’s present situation.
The “land abundance” view of African history relates the continent’s geography to its institu-
tions, and so it is connected to a literature in economics that argues geography is an important
driver of institutional outcomes. This literature has pointed to biogeographical factors, settler
mortality, and other endowments as important ultimate causes of institutions. (Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005).
I validate this perspective by tracing how land abundance shaped economic institutions among
the Egba of southwestern Nigeria between 1830 and 1914. The Egba resembled in many ways
the standard predictions for a land-abundant society. Land markets were thin and rights over
land were often only temporary. Slavery was widespread, and small farmers relied on dependents
and cooperative work groups to supply labor. Credit was extended for consumption loans at
high interest rates. There are, however, two principal exceptions to this pattern. First, the
Egba sold land amongst themselves as early as 1870. Second, land disputes existed. These
deviations are explained by initially high population densities created by the settlement of the
Egba as refugees at Abeokuta, and by the specific features of certain parcels of land that gave
them uncommon value. In addition, other forces shaped factor markets in ways consistent with
the “land abundance” view; slaves were used where the return was high by those whose cost of
keeping slaves was low, while the rising value of tree crops increased the availability of collateral
and supply of credit.
Detailed study of a single society makes it possible to form a clear understanding of what
institutions such as land rights and slavery entailed in practice, rather than as abstract concepts.
The interaction between the markets in credit, labor, and reproduction was complex, and can
be best understood considering them together. Since longitudinal data on institutions in pre-
colonial Africa do not exist, tracing societies through the archival record is the only means
available to study the development of institutions over a long period. In other work (Fenske,
2010), I have confirmed that the “land abundance” view can explain institutional differences in
a cross section of pre-colonial African societies.
In Section 2, I provide historical background on the Egba. In Section 3, I outline the sources
that I use. In Section 4, I describe property rights in land; these were poorly defined, while
markets for land were thin. The exceptions to this pattern – land sales and land disputes – are
also discussed in this section. In Section 5, I turn to labor, noting the absence of a market for
free labor, the use of slaves, and the importance of wives and dependents. In Section 6, I look
at capital, noting the difficulty in borrowing without land as collateral. This was eased after
1890 by the arrival of cocoa and kola. In Section 7, I conclude.
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Figure 1. The Egba in Nigeria
Source: Willink minorities commission. Downloaded from www.waado.org.
2. Historical Background
The Egba are a Yoruba-speaking group, currently located in the central portions of Ogun
State. The colonial Egba division is depicted as part of Abeokuta Province in Figure 1. The
Egba settled as refugees at the site of Abeokuta in 1830, and remained formally independent
from British rule until 1914. Political power before 1914 lay at the more decentralized level of
the township,1 and was divided among the the olorogun (war chiefs), ogboni (civil chiefs), ode
(hunters), and parakoyi (trade chiefs).
1The Egba townships correspond roughly to the villages occupied by the Egba before their removal to Abeokuta.
Estimates of the number of these townships vary; Burton (1863, p. 170) gives 150; Ajisafe (1924, p. 18) writes
“not less than three hundred”; Johnson (1921, p. 93) states 153; Fadipe (1970, p. 48) gives 145, Stone (1900,
p. 38) gives 110, and Ward-Price (1939, p. 87) states 70.
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In the mid-nineteenth century, the Egba cultivated maize, cotton, yams, cassava and beans,
supplementing these with other crops.2 These were intercropped and planted in heaps.3 Palm
products were their principal exports, and the Egba were among the first Yoruba groups to be-
come involved in this trade.4 Cocoa spread from Lagos after 1890 due to the efforts of merchants
and demobilized soldiers seeking new opportunities.5 Many early planters were Christians, sup-
ported by evangelists, Lagos businesses, and Agege planters such as J.K. Coker, who had a 2,000
acre farm and employed more than 200 laborers.6 Kola trees were also introduced through Lagos
by repatriated slaves and Lagos Christians, with British encouragement.7
Situated close to Lagos, the Egba were important in the nineteenth century trade and politics
of the city, and were an early focus of missionary efforts.8 The representatives of the Egba
United Government (EUG)9 highlighted the peculiar institutional development of the Egba in
their testimony to the West African Lands Committee (WALC) in 1913 by giving answers
different from the other Yoruba representatives, in particular claiming that sale of land was a
long-standing custom.10 Mabogunje (1961) attributes this to the unusual settlement pattern of
the Egba, who began as a densely populated group of refugees and expanded slowly outwards
from Abeokuta over the next seventy years. That Egba institutions changed over the course of
the nineteenth century makes it possible to test whether the predictions of the economic theory
of land abundance were realized.
3. Sources
Court records are a commonly used source for economic historians and Africanists.11 They
make it possible to go beyond the idealized descriptions of institutions given other sources
and observe how they worked in practice. The principal source that I use for this study is a
collection of 541 Native Court cases involving farmland that took place between 1902 and 1919.
I have used these for both qualitative descriptions of Egba institutions and for quantitative
data. In addition, I use missionary records, travelers’ descriptions, official correspondence and
private letters; these are taken from published sources, the Church Missionary Society (CMS)
Archive, the Rhodes’ House Library (RHL), the National Archives of the UK (NAUK), and the
National Archives of Nigeria in Ibadan (NAI) and Abeokuta (NAA). Ten elderly Egba men and
women also served as informants. These interviews were conducted, recorded and translated
from Yoruba by Joseph Ayodukun using questionnaires I prepared in 2007. Transcripts of these
2See Barber (1857, p. 100), Burton (1863, p. 62) and Delany (1861, p. 33).
3Burton (1863), p. 62.
4Lynn (1997), p. 41.
5Berry (1975), p. 51.
6Agiri (1972), p. 164.
7Agiri (1977), p. 7-8.
8Tucker (1853)
9The central government of the independent Egba from 1893 to 1914; the name “Egba United Government” was
not adopted until 1898.
10Mabogunje (1961), p. 258.
11See, for example, Dickerman (1984), Chanock (1985), Dickerman et al. (1990), Mann and Roberts (1991), Moore
(1986), Ogilvie (2003), or Roberts (2005).
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interviews are available upon request. Because the time period of this study predates living
memory, these capture oral tradition and normative rules more than historical fact. Finally, I
have built on the descriptions given by other scholars. I have relied heavily on Oroge (1971)
and Agiri (1981) to provide details of Egba slavery, and Byfield (2002) and McIntosh (2009) to
outline women’s roles in the Egba economy.
Two sets of Native Court records are used for this study. The first is taken from the Egba
Council Records (ECR) deposited in the National Archives, Abeokuta (NAA), and contains
Civil and Criminal Record Books mostly from the period 1899-1904. The second is housed in
the Hezekiah Oluwasanmi Library at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. From this collection,
I have used Civil Judgment Books from the Ake “A” and “B” Grade Courts, the Ake Central
Court, the Abeokuta Mixed Court, and the Abeokuta Native Court of Appeal. Other cases from
these collections (for example, suits relating to urban land, manumission certificates or divorce)
are cited in the text, but not included in the sample used for the quantitative analysis.
Histories of the Native Courts have been provided by Adewoye (1977) for Southern Nigeria
as a whole and Pallinder-Law (1974) for Egbaland. Before 1904, the court records that survive
consist of the Alake and council of the EUG exercising their judicial authority. While courts for
each of the four Egba sections were established in 1901, the non-Ake courts were abolished in
1904. The Ake court was then moved into a new building, to lessen the Alake’s influence over
its decisions. Cases used for this study from 1904 and later are primarily from this court. Its
judges were literate Egba, appointed by the EUG (by the Egba Native Authority after 1914),
and it had both civil and criminal jurisdiction. It is clear from the records that the courts, while
empowered to enforce unwritten “native law and custom,” followed a judicial process that was
“essentially arbitrational, aimed at restoring harmony by negotiating a settlement acceptable
to both parties” (Pallinder-Law, 1974, p. 84). If both litigants were closely related, the court
might remit the case to be settled amicably “at home.” Similarly, while “private” courts were
ostensibly illegal, it is clear that the ogboni (civil chiefs) continued to hear the majority of cases,
and that only those they could not settle were taken to the Ake court in Abeokuta. The Alake
was frequently accused of interfering in the court’s operation before 1914.
A typical record begins by noting the names of the litigants and either their home villages or
township affiliations, as well as the number of the case. A complete record has been transcribed
as Appendix A. The plaintiff’s cause of action and claim for damages are also given in the
header, alongside the farm’s location (e.g. “at Kori Ogude”); the majority of claims are for
either recovery of farmland or damages for trespassing and reaping crops. The testimony is
recorded in English longhand, though it is likely the participants spoke mostly in Yoruba. The
judgments delivered usually range from a sentence to a short paragraph, stating how the land
is to be divided and what damages are to be paid.
Summary statistics for the court cases are presented in Table 1. Only two thirds of the case
records are complete. Cases are often adjourned so that parties can call further witness or so
that the land can be “inspected.” Available records are frequently incomplete, since a case may
be resumed in another judgment book which no longer survives, or may be continued from a
similarly non-extant book. Inspection of the land enters the court records only as the verbal
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean
Std.
Dev. Min Max N
Case characteristics
Case is complete 0.66 0.47 0 1 541
Claim is for recovery 0.64 0.48 0 1 541
Claim is for trespassing 0.23 0.42 0 1 541
Year 1914 5.15 1902 1919 541
Land characteristics
Cocoa 0.27 0.44 0 1 541
Palm Trees 0.38 0.48 0 1 541
Water 0.072 0.26 0 1 541
Value and transactions
Damages claimed or value stated 14.9 29.9 0.50 300 366
Land has ever been pawned 0.25 0.43 0 1 541
Land has ever been sold 0.12 0.33 0 1 541
Strategies
Boundary ever made 0.15 0.36 0 1 541
Crops or boundaries ever destroyed 0.094 0.29 0 1 541
Dispute previously taken to chiefs 0.26 0.44 0 1 541
Caretaker ever left behind 0.11 0.32 0 1 541
Juju ever placed 0.059 0.24 0 1 541
User ever driven out 0.089 0.28 0 1 541
Notes: “Water” indicates a stream, river, marsh or swamp. “Cocoa,” “Kola” and “Palm Trees” indicate that
these are stated to exist on the land in dispute.
report of the officer who conducted it. At these public meetings, “villagers,” elders and chiefs
were called to give evidence and identify boundaries. The court invariably takes the reports
of these examinations as declarations of fact. Events are mis-counted due both to disputants’
selective presentation of facts and to this incompleteness. In trespass cases, the amount claimed
is for the damage done, while in recovery cases it is for the entire value of the land. Cocoa
had been planted on roughly a quarter of the plots, and kola was planted on little over a tenth.
Many plots had been pawned at some point in their history, and more than a tenth had been
sold. This last measure is problematic, since “sale” is used as an accusation of wrongdoing and
as another word for pawning.
Several strategies for defending claims are also evident in Table 1; boundaries were either
made by the participants, the township chiefs, or the “villagers.” Many disputes were taken
to the chiefs before coming to court. Jujus (objects with supernatural power) such as aya or
mariwo were placed in a farm to prevent other parties from entering; these provided a signal
that the land was under dispute, and a fear of supernatural punishment if ignored. An opponent
could also be driven from the land.
This is a selected sample, and so these numbers are clearly not representative of all Egba
farms. In particular, the parcels of land that are disputed are likely to be those that are most
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valuable, and the conflicts that actually come to court are likely to be the most difficult fights
over the most prized plots. Despite this selection, it is clear that by 1919 the cocoa boom was
underway, that pawning of land was common, and sale of farm land existed. Further, when
these interests were worth defending, Egba farmers used a variety of strategies to pursue their
claims.
4. Land
Theory suggests that, with land abundance, monitoring costs in agriculture, and simple tech-
nology, land will have no price, land per farmer will be independent of household size or wealth,
and common property in land will exist as an insurance substitute (Binswanger and McIntire,
1987). This is because, with easy access to land and simple technology, cultivators can produce
as much on their own as working for a landowner, who cannot compensate them for the forgone
self-cultivation. This result depends on the existence of monitoring costs and other inefficien-
cies that prevent a laborer from being paid his marginal product. These problems are reduced
with long-term contracts and by the use of family labor (Bharadwaj, 2008). This explains the
reliance on compulsion, reciprocal obligations, and the labor of family members and dependents
described in Section 5. Simple technology prevents the existence of economies of scale, which
would permit sufficiently large farms to pay attractive wages to laborers even in the presence of
monitoring costs. Boserup (1965, p. 13) argues that exogenous population growth increases the
frequency of cultivation; families become more “conscious and jealous about their special right
to the old plots” (p. 80), reduce fallow, and exert effort to retain their rights. Demsetz (1967,
p. 350), similarly, suggests that integration into the world market will similarly lead property
rights to develop in order to internalize externalities.
In 1911, Lugard estimated that the whole of the Egba Division had an area of 1869 square
miles (slightly smaller than Delaware) and a population of 265,000 - a density of 142 per square
mile.12 This is less dense than present-day Coˆte d’Ivoire or Kenya. Even at this intermediate
density, free land was accessible to independent farmers, who cultivated fewer than five acres
annually.13 In 1877, the missionary James Johnson reported that individuals could acquire land
for farming freely if they developed it from forest, or in return for token payments.14 Grants
were traditionally either tito15 or fifun. If the gift was tito, the owner of a piece of “virgin”
forest received presents from the grantee. When the recipient cleared the forest, he became its
absolute owner.16 Although clearing required labor (Forde et al. (1946, p. 92, 113-114) estimate
48 to 92 man-days per acre), this was spread out over the first three years. Trees were burned
after felling, with the roots left in place, and two maize crops could be planted during the first
year.17 The Yoruba proverb that “a farmer’s period of hunger is three months” (the length
12WALC (1916a), p. 24.
13The Olofin of Ilogbo estimated that his subjects cultivated three acres each in 1902 (NAUK, CO 147/162, enc
in 20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain).
14Agiri (1974), p. 467.
15Partridge (1911, p. 429) uses the term Egan, meaning “forest”.
16Folarin (1939), p. 74.
17Ant (1902), p. 319.
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of time needed for the first maize crop to mature) is evidence that clearing costs were not an
insurmountable barrier to taking new land from forest.18 A man who wished to take forest in
his own village could call on the help of one of the co-operative work groups described in Section
5.
A migrant would receive a fifun grant of already cleared land known as igboro or irapa. Under
the rules of the mawoke (“don’t look up”) system, he was not permitted to plant permanent
crops, to reap the fruit of trees on the land, or to alienate it.19 This does not mean that he
would be reduced to tenancy. Fadipe (1970, p. 176) states that fifun grants were intended to
be temporary, enabling the recipient “to have the means of subsistence at his disposal, with
the minimum delay, while the forest land that was granted him was being cleared and prepared
for cultivation.” The payments given for such grants were typically small, and the descriptions
given by Folarin (1939, p. 74-75), Partridge (1911, p. 428-433), or Lloyd (1962, p. 262-267) make
them appear more formal than they actually were. The land abundance view of African history
stresses that these payments were symbolic, not charging users for the value of the land, but
establishing the power of local authorities to regulate community membership. Statements in the
court records rarely state that any conditions were attached; the grant to Lukosi in Appendix
A is an example. Even for planting cocoa or kola, land could be acquired virtually without
cost. Early planters obtained their land without payments, before the owners were aware of its
value. After 1885, many Lagos Egba often obtained free grants from the landowning families
near Agege and Ilu.20 While Ward-Price (1939, p. 90-93) reported that land for planting cocoa
sold at roughly £3 and two bottles of gin per acre during the 1930s, much had already been
given away and the chiefs could no longer obtain any revenues from it.21 Many migrants chose
to plant at Otta because an individual could farm a piece of land while serving a master and
obtain ownership of a plot if he settled permanently.22 One interviewee reported that when his
grandfather obtained land at Ilogbo all that had been asked for was prayer wine.23
During the remainder of this section, I discuss evidence that Egba land use and tenure were
driven by the abundance of land. The market for land was thin. Agriculture economized on
labor and few investments were made. Property rights were ambiguously defined. Land sales
and disputes, however, both existed. Mabogunje (1958, 1959, 1961) has argued that Egba land
tenure was altered by their settlement pattern; his argument is reinterpreted here as a Boserupian
response to changes in the land-labor ratio. In addition, even as land in general was abundant,
specific pieces of land had particular value.
18Fadipe (1970), p. 177.
19Folarin (1939), p. 74-75.
20NAI, Fowler “A Report on the Lands of the Colony Districts,” p. 30.
21All money values are nominal. Following the UK retail price index from EH.net, the retail price index in Britain
over the course of this study started at 96.55 in 1830, ended at 102.5 in 1914, bottomed out at 83.81 in 1851, and
peaked at 112.95 in 1867. Misstatements of value due to the use of nominal values will be less than 20% in either
direction. The notation used is the standard notation that was used for pounds, shillings, and pence before the
pound was decimalized in 1971. £1/2/3 denotes one pound, 2 shillings (s), and 3 pence (d). £1/2 denotes one
pound, two shillings. 1/2 denotes one shilling, two pence. £1 denotes one pound. 2s denotes two shillings. 3d
denotes 3 pence.
22Agiri (1972), p. 176.
23Chief M. O. Adeyinka, Odofin of Africa General Totoro, 26 July, 2007. No 1 Totoro Street, Owu Abeokuta.
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4.1. Thin land markets. Because land was cheaply available, markets for it were thin. Burton
(1863, p. 96), after visiting Abeokuta in 1860, wrote that there were two ideas “incomprehensible
to Europeans, but part and parcel of the African mind. The first ... is that a slave-born man
is a slave for ever. The second is the non-alienation of land.” In an 1878 schedule of property
for the CMS Yoruba Mission,24 none of the land held in Egba territory was declared to have
any value apart from the buildings on it. At Osiele, it was noted that “land property cannot
be estimated here as to the value, because the practice of selling land is not customary in this
village.” While Egba officials were testifying that land sales were a long-standing custom, many
Egba questioned their legitimacy. The defendant in a 1905 suit25 stated that “we Arawo people
refused to see any of our land sold, we agree that any body can till the ground but not to sell it.”
Similarly, the inspecting officer in a 1915 case told the court that “Itoko people have objection
to their lands being sold.”26 The terms on which land was leased to the British also reflected
its low market value; in 1914, the colonial government held ten plots of land on lease from the
Egba Native Authority totalling a little over 26,000 acres and on which annual rents were below
£600 – less than a shilling an acre.27
4.2. Extensive agriculture. Egba agriculture economized on labor but not on land. Land
was cultivated for five or six years, followed by five to six years of fallow, and then two or three
more years of cultivation before a long fallow of up to twenty years.28 Besides cocoa and kola,
there were no fixed investments made and no fertilizers used. Crop rotations in which maize and
yams gave way to water-yams during the end of the cultivation cycle adapted to deteriorating
productivity rather than restoring it.29
When a plot was exhausted, it was common for farmers to relinquish their claims and rely
on the memories of those left behind in order to reassert them years later. In one suit, the
defendant Oyedele had been a small child when compelled to leave the farm during the Ado
war.30 He returned around 1909, and came with a case of gin asking to be shown his father’s
land. On finding it occupied, he, according to the plaintiff, “began to point to any farm he met
by the way, all which he called his father’s when he was corrected by an old pawn of his father
... who took him to the old site of his father’s farm which had long been taken by Itoko chiefs.”
One strategy for retaining control of abandoned land was to grant usufruct rights (such as
reaping palm nuts) to a “caretaker.” With time, however, the plot could fall into the hands
of the caretaker or his children. In a 1915 suit, the plaintiff Lawani had left land with the
defendant’s father, a half-brother. The defendant’s father planted kola trees prior to 1895.31
Though he had stated he was “prepared to give pltf [plaintiff] out of it,” his daughter (the
24CMS, CA2/O14 Buildings and Property.
25Ake Central Suit 209/1905.
26Abeokuta Civil Suit 403/1915.
27NAUK, CO 583/10, enc. in Feb 16, 1914: Lugard to Harcourt
28NAUK, CO 147/162, enc. in 20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain.
29Dennett (1910), p. 141.
30Ake “A” Civil Suit 235/1917. There was more than one Ado war; this was likely c. 1843 or 1853.
31Abeokuta Civil Suit 578/1915.
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defendant) refused to honor the promise. The court divided the land, ordering the plaintiff to
compensate the defendant for the kola trees that ended up in his possession.
4.3. Weakly defined land rights. With land freely available and extensive cultivation tech-
niques, property rights over land were poorly defined and rarely permanent. This was striking
to Europeans. Clarke (1871, p. 259) wrote that land was “held by possession and only so long
as cultivated unless it is vacated with a reserved right.”32 Campbell (1861, p. 35) recorded his
impressions in greater detail:
The tenure of property is as it is among civilized people, except as to land,
which is deemed common property; every individual enjoys the right of taking
unoccupied land, as much as he can use, wherever and whenever he pleases. It is
deemed his property as long as he keeps it in use; after that, it is again common
property.
Clarke (1871, p. 260) described Yoruba farms has having the “unbroken appearances of a single
field,” as no fences were used and only a “small path” might exist to show where one farm
ended and another began. In actual fact, natural features such as streams and roads were
taken as boundaries, and porogun trees were planted as markers. These were not generally
placed, however, until a dispute had already arisen. Otherwise, it was not worthwhile. Egba
land tenure was not put down as a coherent set of rules until it became important to do so in
negotiations with British officials. Johnson (1921, p. 95-97), in his nationalist history, wrote
that the “land laws of the Yoruba country are simple and effective, there being no need of any
complicated or elaborate laws,” while admitting that these were “to be observed rather in the
spirit than in the letter.”
The process by which land disputes were resolved was informal and often indeterminate.
Generally, the bale (village head) was responsible for disputes arising within his compound.33
His authority depended on his personality and was exercised in consultation with other household
members.34 Interviewees suggested that the importance of the bale (village head) derived from
his knowledge of the land in question and his personal authority:
For household head it is usually the oldest which is believe to know the history of
the settlement and what belong to who in the settlement than anybody therefore
his statement about land is held as final.35
If the parties were not satisfied with the bale’s (village head’s) intervention, they could go to
the township chiefs, relegating the bale’s (village head’s) role to that of arbitrator.36 In nearly
a quarter of the sample cases, a previous attempt at settlement had been made before the local
chiefs. Disputes were not settled decisively, but were instead subject to ongoing renegotiation.
32See Stone (1900, p. 21) for a similar observation.
33Stone (1900), p. 28.
34Blair (1937), p. 16.
35Interview: J. A. Adediran, 9 Aug, 2007.
36Blair (1937), p. 32.
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4.4. Land sales and land disputes. Although land markets were thin, the existence of land
sales was noted before the WALC. Similarly, the records I use are evidence that some land was
valuable enough to be disputed in court. Mabogunje (1958, 1959, 1961) links the existence of
land sales to the conditions under which Abeokuta was settled in 1830 and the area around it
occupied over the next century. During the initial scramble for land, townships were asked to
waive their rights so that newcomers could settle, disrupting ogboni (civil chiefs’) claims in favor
of family control.37 Households located dwellings in the middle of their farms in order to lay
claim to them.38 During the initial settlement, the only land safe for farming was located in a
small region bounded on the northeast by Osiele, on the Southeast by Oba, and on the North
by Aiyetoro.39 These are shown in Figure 1. In 1846, farms were still confined to the immediate
neighborhood of Abeokuta.40
“Behind the movements of the Egba armies,” Mabogunje (1959, p. 72) argues, “followed their
farmers.” By 1861, farms extended twenty or thirty miles from the town walls.41 By 1878 they
had stretched out towards Otta and occupied the territory between Owode and Mokoloki.42
Much land in the South was still uncultivated in 1877, and expansion to the Northeast was
impossible before 1893.43 After this date, many of the oriles (the ruined sites of the original
townships) were reoccupied. The first re-settlers reported to the township chiefs and were made
responsible for dividing land among later settlers.44
Mabogunje’s argument is one in which the initial scramble for land created strategies of village
establishment that disrupted ogboni (civil chiefs’) control of land, but later reaffirmed it during
the reoccupation of the oriles (deserted villages). An alternative interpretation would view the
Egba case as a Boserupian response to an exogenous shock to population density. Johnson
(1921, p. 17) describes the original home of the Egba as having an area of more than 1,000
square miles,45 while the area of initial settlement described by Mabogunje (1961) is only about
160 square miles in area.46 Observers put the population of Abeokuta in mid-century between
60,000 and 150,000.47 This gives a range of reasonable density estimates ranging from 375 to
938 per square mile. Even accounting for the upward bias that results from using the population
after twenty years of growth and in-migration, the ratio of men to land from 1830 to 1860 was
much higher than at the end of the century.
37Mabogunje (1961), p. 266.
38Mabogunje (1958), p. 24.
39Mabogunje (1961), p. 260.
40Oroge (1971), p. 186.
41Oroge (1971), p. 189.
42Agiri (1974), p. 469.
43Mabogunje (1959), p. 74.
44Mabogunje (1958), p. 48-49.
45Specifically, he describes it as a parallelogram with its points at Ijaye, Olokemeji, Ibadan, and the coast.
46It is effectively an oval roughly ten miles by twenty.
47Barber (1857, p. 19), 80,000 c. 1845; Freeman (1844, p. 227), twice the size of Kumasi in 1842; Bowen (1857,
p. 106), 60,000 to 100,000 in 1850; Beecroft estimated the population at 300,000 in 1850, Hockin estimated the
population at 70,000 in 1866, Irving estimated it at 100,000 in 1862, and Forbes estimated it at 50,000 in 1848
according to Townsend (1887, p. 106, 154, 160); Campbell (1861, p. 33), more than 100,000 in 1860; Burton (1863,
p. 170), 150,000 in 1861 when the soldiers return. Mabogunje (1961, p. 260) gives three examples of missionaries
who put their estimates above 100,000 in private correspondence.
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In addition to Mabogunje’s sources, there is evidence that Egba farmers expanded outwards as
the risks due to war diminished. In 1863, the Governor of Lagos reported that “the natives of the
villages dare not cultivate far from their homes lest they should be kidnapped whilst labouring
on their farms, and their only protection is the impenetrable bush, which has now overrun again
immense tracts of land which but three years ago were covered with fine farms.”48 In 1893, fear
of Dahomey raids was still keeping the country west of Abeokuta clear of settlement.49 In 1893,
however, Halligey (1893, p. 31-32, 36) commented that the land between Abeokuta and Otta
had, “within the last few years, ... been largely cleared of its forest and thick brush in order to
be put in cultivation.”50
Figure 2. Punch‘s Tour of Egba Country, 1902
Evidence that the period of land scarcity altered Egba farming practices as Boserup’s theory
predicts comes from Cyril Punch’s 1902 tour of the Egba country. Some of the sites he visited
are depicted in Figure 2.51 Three differences were still apparent between the land-scarce region
of initial settlement and those areas occupied later. First, farmers near Abeokuta shortened
their periods of fallow. Between Abeokuta and Aberu Agba, Punch reported fallow lengths of
3-4 years, 5-6 years, and 4 years. Between Ijeun and Ashero (northeast of Mokoloki), he reported
48CO 147/3, 5 Jan, 1863: Freeman to Newcastle
49NAI, CMS Y 2/2/2 Papers on Abeokuta District 1861-1910, Jan 1893: Letter from Oluminide (name not clearly
legible).
50In 1898, similarly, witnesses told the Commission on Trade that the Egba were returning to land vacated during
the wars – “from 5 miles below our crossing of the River Ogun, the whole valley, down to Abeokuta may be taken
as cultivated.” (CO 147/133, enc in 4 June 1898: Denton to Chamberlain, Thirteenth Day, extract from Mr.
Berger’s Report on the Abeokuta-Ibadan Reconnaissance Survey).
51NAUK, CO 147/162: 20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain.
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three times that land was left fallow for 5-6 years. Second, Egba cultivators used intercropping
more intensively on the exhausted soils nearer Abeokuta. Third, farmers abandoned the long
fallows that allowed the land to return to forest. Punch mentions indefinite or very long fallow
periods between Kajola (East of Onibode) and Aberu Agba, Ijeun and Asha, Asha and Ilogbo,
Coker’s farm and Ashero, and between Okenla and Itori. None of these are in the first stretch
from Abeokuta to Onibode, and only one is in the directly southern region where the Egba made
their first military expansions. He encountered little forest before Ijeun and between Okenla and
Itori.52 Punch himself believed that the Egba were expanding into “a belt adjoining the forest
and this belt is gradually encroaching on the forest and is itself being encroached on by second
rate [fallow] land.”
It remains to explain land disputes. The period of land scarcity contributed to this by making
the conditions of grants more contentious. In a 1919 suit,53 the plaintiff Ajayi claimed that the
defendant Rolu had encroached on his land when Ajayi’s father Feyijimi died, extracting two
acres and claiming that he had lent the land to Feyijimi. The representative of the township
chiefs told the court that Rolu’s father had, in fact, granted the land to Feyijimi as forest, but
that Feyijimi had been the first to cultivate it. Rolu denied this, claiming that it had been
given as already cleared land during the Ikorodu War (c. 1865). His witness told the court that
“there was no forest remaining” at that time. What would have otherwise been a temporary
grant with few conditions attached, allowing Feyijimi to plant food crops while he cleared new
land, was turned by the scarcity of forest into a holding whose ownership was contested more
than fifty years later.
Austin (2008) notes that, while land may be abundant in general, specific plots are valuable for
their particular characteristics. Bowen (1857, p. 282) remarked that Egba farms were often ten
to twenty miles distant from the towns; many of the cases unsurprisingly involve encroachment
into a neighboring farm. This did not necessarily result from poorly-defined boundaries; in a
1915 case, the defendant planted cocoa underneath that of the plaintiff while the latter’s niece,
who had been left in charge, was ill.54 Similarly, some sites were desirable for the protection
that could be offered by the olorogun (war chiefs). In a 1907 suit, the son of the late Balogun of
Ijemo stated that during a conflagration, the Igbein people had run to his father at Esi Elebo,
who granted them land.55
The court cases can be used to show that some land was more valuable and worth defending.
I estimate regressions of the form:
(1) yi = β0 +
∑
c
βcCi +X
′
iγ + i
52Fairhead and Leach (1996) demonstrate the problems of attributing deforestation to human causes. Still,
the pattern of forest clearing here is consistent with what is known about the Egba removal to Abeokuta and
subsequent re-expansion. The alternative narrative of forests created by recent human habitation is not plausible
in the Egba case.
53Ake A Civil Suit 29/1919, re-hearing of Suit 1125 of 1917.
54Abeokuta Civil Suit 906/1915.
55Ake “A” Civil Suit 725/07.
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Here yi denotes an outcome of interest in case i. The Xi are other characteristics of the case;
dummies for whether it is a recovery case, whether it is a complete record, and the judgment
book from which the case is taken.56 The Ci are indicators for the crops affixed to the land.
It is expected that the estimated βc coefficients will be significant and positive, indicating that
these made plots more valuable, marketable, and worth defending.
Results are given in Table 2. The general pattern that emerges is that land that was more
valuable due to the crops on it was more vigilantly defended and more likely to be involved in
a commercial transaction. Plots endowed with palm trees were more likely to be pawned, and
more likely to have been defended through the use of a caretaker. Plots with either tree crop
were more likely to have been discussed before the township chiefs; either disputes were more
common over these or parties expended more effort in pursuing their claims over them.
Plots on which cocoa stood were, on average, more than £7 more valuable than other plots.
Cocoa was suited for well-watered, marshy soil. The direct negative effect of “water” shows that
this is what would otherwise have been the worst land, and so the likely endogeneity bias implies
that this is an underestimate. Once marshy land acquired value, stale claims were reasserted.
In a 1909 suit, the plaintiff’s brother had planted kola on the defendant’s land in 1872 without
dispute, but the defendant attempted decades later to reclaim it.57 The inspector reported that
“it is now that people are using marshy soil for cocoa plantations that dfdt [defendant] came to
claim.” Though the plaintiff was evicted, the defendant was ordered to pay compensation for
the kola. The negative estimate for the impact of palm trees on value is surprising. One possible
explanation is that disputes over this type of land often centered on more limited claims, where
palm fruits had been stolen on one or two occasions; the damages claimed in these cases are
more likely to be a flow measure, rather than the total stock of of value.
5. Labor
The theory of agrarian institutions suggests that with easy access to land and monitoring
costs, employers cannot compensate laborers for forgone self-cultivation. As a result, there
will be no laboring class and almost no hiring of labor during the peak season (Binswanger
and McIntire, 1987). Vertically extended households, whose heads have claims over the labor
of their dependents, substitute for insurance and annuities that the thin capital market cannot
provide (see below). Land abundance is also one of the dominant explanations of slavery. Domar
(1970), building on Nieboer (1900), ties the the existence of serfdom in Eastern Europe to labor
scarcity; free land, free peasants, and non-working landowners cannot coexist.58 Lagerlo¨f (2009),
56These are finer than year dummies.
57Abeokuta Civil Suit 91/1909.
58Conning (2004) has formalized this reasoning, finding that the return to enslavement rises with the land-labor
ratio. Contra Domar (1970), North and Thomas (1971) argue that, during the fourteenth century, plagues in
Europe increased the land-labor ratio, intensifying competition between landlords for tenants and resulting in
a relaxation of servile obligations. Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), similarly, argue that abundant land and an
absence of scale economies prevented the formation of large estates in Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York and
Canada. In both these examples, the failure of slavery to emerge resulted from the limited means of coercion
available to would-be lords. North and Thomas (1971) suggest that the lack of a centralized state failed to prevent
slaveowners from competing over slaves. In the North American case, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) acknowledge
that the northern U.S. was priced out of the market for slaves as early as the 1760s.
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Table 2. Plot characteristics, transactions, and strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value and transactions
Damages
claimed or
value stated
Land has ever
been pawned
Land has ever
been sold
Cocoa 7.40** 0.04 0.06*
(3.172) (0.037) (0.034)
Palm Trees -6.26** 0.11*** 0.01
(2.441) (0.027) (0.015)
Water -7.89*** -0.13* 0.03
(1.446) (0.071) (0.056)
Observations 366 534 532
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Judgment Book F.E. Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0795 0.0413 0.0712
p Value (Cocoa/Palms) 0.04 0.00 0.06
Strategies
Crops or
boundaries
ever
destroyed
Dispute
previously
taken to
chiefs
Caretaker
ever left
behind
User ever
driven out
Cocoa 0.09** 0.10** -0.01 0.07*
(0.044) (0.044) (0.027) (0.038)
Palm Trees 0.01 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.02
(0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.026)
Water 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.01
(0.079) (0.049) (0.071) (0.030)
Observations 532 535 451 532
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judgment Book F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.132 0.0683 0.0505 0.0593
p Value (Cocoa/Palms) 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.16
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions except with “Damages/Value” are probit, with marginal effects (calculated using dprobit in Stata)
reported. “Damages/Value” is OLS. Other controls are a dummy if the claim is for recovery and a dummy if
the case is complete. Standard errors are clustered by judgment book. For probit regressions, the “pseudo”
R-squared is reported. The p value is for the joint significance of the cocoa and palm tree variables.
in a formalization of this analysis, shows that increasing the productivity of land in agriculture
for a given population will make slavery more likely; slave owners become more willing to incur
the inefficiency cost of slavery (labor wasted on guarding) in order to expropriate a share of the
now larger economy. Unsurprisingly, lower costs of keeping slaves will also promote their use.
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Land abundance is also held to affect family structure. Goody (1969) argues that the ability of
distant relatives to inherit in Africa relative to Eurasia is due to the lack of class differentiation
and low value of land. Similarly, Goody (1976) suggests that polygyny exists where allocating
land to additional wives is less costly.
Because land was abundant, labor was scarce in Egba territory. The result was that it was
uncommon for men to exchange their labor for cash; for the freeborn, it was “opprobrious.”59
As land was virtually free, individuals could earn more working for themselves than as hired
laborers. Even during the slack season, farmers could gather palm fruits or forest produce.60
Further, the considerable distances between Egba farms raised the costs of supervision. Where
wage-labor existed, it was provided by foreign visitors with deep pockets and few dependents.
The workers employed in printing the missionary newsletter were paid four to five dollars per
month.61 Even these foreigners, however, had trouble acquiring labor. In 1854, the missionary
Henry Townsend wrote that, “to keep down the salaries of the native agents of the society is
very difficult more especially so as some of them have had a taste of European life in a style far
above their means.”62 During their free days, slaves preferred to cultivate for themselves rather
than work for wage labor for the missionaries, and James Johnson could not find anyone to tend
a horse for 15s per month in 1877.63
This section deals in turn with three of the mechanisms used by the Egba to cope with
labor scarcity – slavery, cooperative work groups, and claims over the labor power of kin and
dependents.
5.1. Slavery. The use of slaves was widespread. While Oroge (1971) recognized that slavery
was a solution to the absence of wage labor, he did not attribute this to the availability of free
land. Townsend wrote in 1846 that “the working part of the population” consisted “chiefly” of
slaves, while in the 1870s Johnson wrote that slaves were a “very considerable” proportion of
the population.64 Bowen (1857, p. 320) estimated in mid-century that at least four fifths of the
population were “free.”65 James Davies told the 1898 Commission on Trade that a third of the
original inhabitants were slaves, and that women were the most valuable of these.66 Many slave
owners could not conceive of alternative sources of labor supply; Christian converts who could
be persuaded to give up polygyny often would not abandon their slaves.67
Slaves were generally strangers,68 and became slaves as a result of famine, capture, debt,
or as punishment for crime.69 Initially, the Egba raided their southern neighbors for slaves.70
59Agiri (1974), p. 467.
60Clarke (1871), p. 262.
61Burton (1863), p. 76.
62CMS CA2/O85 #23: Aug 5, 1854: Townsend to Straith.
63Oroge (1971), p. 244-245.
64Oroge (1971), p. 166.
65Burton (1863, p. 299) made the same estimate.
66NAUK, CO 147/133, enc in 4 June, 1898: Denton to Chamberlain. Evidence for 18th day.
67Oroge (1971), p. 222.
68Interview: Chief F. Anidugbe, 27 July, 2007.
69Burton (1863), p. 301.
70Agiri (1981), p. 133.
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The increased prominence of the olorogun (war chiefs) gave them an advantage in slaveholding.
First, their costs of keeping slaves were particularly low. These chiefs were often able to evade
the law prohibiting kidnapping from friendly and subject towns.71 Both free and slave soldiers
were required to turn over some or all of their captives to their commanders.72 James Davies
stated that, during the early 1880s, the most prominent men in Abeokuta had up to 400 slaves
and treated them better than their own children.73 Second, the olorogun (war chiefs) could earn
a greater return from slave holding than other Egba. They used their soldier-slaves to collect
tolls, to provide armed escorts for travelers, as blacksmiths, and as horse-minders.74 Some kept
their slaves out of the Ijaiye and Aibo wars in order to keep them on their farms, which Oroge
(1971, p. 165-166) has called “the economic nerve-centres of Yorubaland.”
Over time, slaves were increasingly purchased in markets to the North, in Rabba and Ilorin.
By 1870, James Johnson reported that “Hausa” slaves were predominant in Abeokuta.75 These
northerners were far from home and less likely to flee, again lowering the costs of keeping them.
Bowen (1857, p. 320) put the price of a slave at thirty to sixty dollars, depending on age and
quality.76 In an 1852 letter, Townsend described the plight of a slave communicant, whose
redemption price of sixty dollars was “very far beyond a poor man’s means.”77
Slaves were used as soldiers, and even commanded armies.78 They were used for sacrifice.79
Most, however, were employed in economic pursuits – trade and agriculture. Male and female
slaves were used as porters and canoe pullers, and female slaves were used in palm oil produc-
tion.80 In 1872, the Alake (the most powerful of the four Egba kings) and other Egba officials
wrote to the Governor of Lagos that slaves were used “in the same way as children of our body
begotten, they are to help us in working our farms to obtain the produce needed in the European
market, this is the only investment we have here.”81 James Johnson in 1880 similarly noted that
slaves were considered a better investment than cloths and beads.82
The export market for palm produce encouraged greater use of slave labor. Burton (1863,
p. 301) wrote that “the development of commerce naturally increases the necessity for slave
71Oroge (1971), p. 127.
72Agiri (1981), p. 133.
73NAUK, CO 147/133, enc in 4 June, 1898: Denton to Chamberlain. Evidence for 18th day. Agiri (1974, p. 468)
gives a similar estimate from 1880 that some chiefs had more than 100, and up to 400 slaves.
74Oroge (1971), p. 102-105, 130-131.
75Agiri (1981), p. 137.
76Other price estimates include: Barber (1857, p. 118), £6/10 or 30 heads of cowries for a woman in 1857; Burton
(1863, p. 323), 8 to 10 bags cowries in 1861, 12-16 for slaves preferred for export – at 18s per bag, this was
equivalent to £9 or 40 dollars, and; Alake and other officials 35-40 bags in 1872 (CO 147/23 enc in June 15, 1872:
Pope Hennessey to Kimberly, op. cit.), £16 for a runaway slave in 1862 (Oroge (1975, p. 69)).
77CMS CA2/O85 #13: July 29, 1852: Townsend to Venn.
78Losi (1924), p. 71.
79While Barber (1857, p. 129) describes the situation of a female convert whose Ijebu mistress wished to use her
for a sacrifice for reasons not given, Stone (1900, p. 245) was direct witness to the sacrifice by “the chiefs and
Ogbonee elders” of a slave purchased in the market. This was done in order to gain Ogun’s favor during the Ijaiye
war. Oroge (1971, p. 141), defending “domestic” slavery as opposed to the slave trade, argues that slaves used
for sacrifice were invariably purchased from markets, and that no master would sacrifice his own slave.
80McIntosh (2009), p. 130.
81NAUK, CO 147/23 enc in June 15, 1872: Pope Hennessey to Kimberly.
82Oroge (1971), p. 179.
18 JAMES FENSKE
labour in a land where hired labour is expensive and uncertain.” When James Johnson at-
tempted in 1879 to enforce the CMS policy of forbidding its members from holding slaves, he
was confronted by a group of converts who were also prominent traders – Mary Coker, Lydia
Yemowi, Susanah Lawolu, and Blesy Desola83 – and by “sword-wielding agents of the Egba
authorities.”84 These women demanded roughly £2/10 per year from their trader-slaves, who
could keep the surplus above this, while non-Christian owners were said to have charged less.85
Europeans believed that, without the institution of slavery, there would be an acute shortage
of labor. A faction of missionaries led by Samuel Crowther argued for the continuation of
domestic slavery. While this was in part motivated by an “appreciation of the complex nature
of the institution,” their self-interest in obtaining labor also played a role.86 As Townsend wrote
in 1856, “we are ourselves not in a position to refuse slave labor. A case in point, a servant hired
by Mr Clegg is a slave and a part of the hire goes to his master.”87 No pressure was brought on
the Christian converts to liberate their slaves after 1881, and in 1887 Reverend Wood cautioned
against taking actions to abolish slavery.88
When British intervention in the Yoruba interior became more direct after 1893, expatriate
merchants feared that widespread slave desertions had hurt trade. Rufus Alexander Wright
told the Commission on Trade that in Abeokuta and Ijebu “the slaves have felt safe in running
away. I don’t think there will ever be a return to the old system.”89 One observer wrote in 1893
that “the money value of slaves [was] decreasing, and they [were] showing increased freedom in
word and act” because their chances of escaping to British territory had increased.90 The issue
of labor scarcity was not short-lived; in 1904 MacGregor reported the complaints of Aina, a
“leading farmer,” who argued that there was a “dearth of labor since the cessation of slavery,
and [that] paid labour was now both costly and difficult to obtain.”91
Because of these fears of labor scarcity, both the British and the EUG tacitly endorsed slavery.
Governor McCallum wrote in an 1897 dispatch that he was prepared to write to the ‘native states’
that “as regards domestic slaves the status quo must be maintained and runaways must in all
cases be given up by the governing powers unless funds are forthcoming to pay for the necessary
compensation.”92 The colonial office was sympathetic to his view that there should be no direct
interference with slavery, but forbade him to assist in recovery of fugitive slaves.93
In 1901, the EUG prohibited slave-dealing, though not slave-holding, providing that no person
should be “dealt or traded in, purchased, sold, bartered, transferred or become a slave.”94 At
83Agiri (1981), p. 140.
84Oroge (1975), p. 79.
85Oroge (1971), p. 209.
86Agiri (1981), p. 139.
87CMS CA2/O85 #32: Dec 1, 1856: Townsend to Venn.
88Oroge (1971), p. 281.
89NAUK, CO 147/133, enc in 4 June, 1898: Denton to Chamberlain.
90NAI, CMS/Y/2/2/2, Papers on Abeokuta District, Jan 1893 letter from Oluminde.
91NAUK, CO 147/169 30 Jan, 1904: MacGregor to Lyttelton.
92NAUK, CO 147/121, 20 June, 1897: McCallum to Chamberlain.
93Oroge (1971), p. 387.
94NAI, Abe Prof 8/3, Report Book on Egba Affairs.
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the same time, the EUG declared that a slave could redeem himself for £5 and that an ill-
treated slave could claim freedom.95 The Railway Commissioner acted in concert with the
Egba authorities to help liberate slaves brought into Egba territory or whose masters were
preparing to sell them, but made no moves against slave-holding.96 Several examples of requests
for manumission are in evidence in the Mixed Court Civil Record Book (1907-09), in which
payments of £5/10 or £10/10 are made. Certificates of freedom were issued by the court as late
as 1922.97 Fearing that abolition would destroy the labor supply of the elites on whom they
depended, British officials limited their efforts to slave trading and exceptional cruelty.
5.2. Cooperative work groups. Austin (2008, p. 597-598) argues that the scarcity of labor in
Africa is tempered by the seasonality of labor demand. Bowen (1857, p. 285) noted that during
the dry season, it was possible to “hire any number of people to labor for reduced wages.” A
variety of industries existed to raise the productivity of labor in the off-season, including what
Burton (1863, p. 160) called the “five great crafts” – blacksmith, carpenter, weaver, dyer and
potter. For the typical Egba farmer, however, peak labor demand occurred when manpower
was least available, and independent farmers could not afford large numbers of slaves or pawns.
While a client to could ask his chief to send men to help him clear his farm,98 two types of
cooperative work group – the owe and aro – were the most common solutions.
The owe was an informal arrangement, whereby a man’s sons-in-law, other relatives or neigh-
bors could be commissioned to aid in clearing a land or forest, or in building a house.99 The aro,
by contrast, was a contract between members of the same age-grade to take turns in assisting
each other in clearing, sowing, and harvesting.100 In both cases, the beneficiary “feasted his
benefactors very lavishly” and was obligated to offer his own labor in return.101 That these were
sustained through repeated interaction suggests that they were needed to overcome the moral
hazard problems that hindered the use of wage labor. This was strengthened in the case of the
aro by its semi-religious nature.102
5.3. Wives, kin, and dependents. Egba farmers coped with the shortage of labor by asserting
claims on the labor of other members of their households, by attracting dependants, and by
taking wives. Egba wives retained some economic independence, notably in trade and craft
work; Stone (1900, p. 23-24) wrote that:
women are even more industrious than the men. They have to support themselves
and their children and they most diligently follow the pursuits which custom has
allotted to them. They spin, weave, trade, cook, and dye cotton fabrics. They
95Oroge (1971), p. 403.
96Oroge (1971), p. 404.
97NAI, CSO 26 11799, Question of Slavery in British West Africa, 30 Sept 1924: District Officer, Egba to Resident,
Abeokuta. In this dispatch, the District Officer provides a list of fourteen cases from the years 1918-1922.
98Oroge (1971), p. 151.
99Fadipe (1970), p. 256.
100Agiri (1974), p. 467.
101Agiri (1974), p. 467.
102Oroge (1971), p. 154.
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also make soap, dyes, palm-oil, nut-oil, all the native earthenware and many
other things used in the country.
Despite this independence, marriage transferred current payments of cash and labor for future
claims on the productive and reproductive labor of the wife. Marriages were usually arranged.103
Families manipulated bridewealth to raise money for economic and social projects, and to pay
off debt.104 A woman’s relatives might use coercion and even violence to pressure her to become
married, and to stay married.105 The wife’s family was owed a variety of obligations including
work, regular contributions of harvest crops, and assistance with expenses such as funerals until
the girl reached puberty.106 A second cash payment, which Partridge (1911, p. 425) put between
£2/10 and £10 depending on the wealth of the bride’s parents, was then due.107
Payment of bride-price established claims on the children, and the repayment of bride-price
due on divorce lessened with the birth of children.108 Gollmer (1889, p. 119) described bride-
price (which he guessed at £2 to £5) as a sort of pledge used to chastise a wife – “have I not
paid so much on your head?” or “if you pay the forty or fifty heads of cowries I paid on your
head, you can go home again.” In divorce cases, it was common for men to receive custody
of the children, under the traditional belief that children “belonged” to their father.109 In a
1919 suit,110 the plaintiff sued because his wife had been “seduced” by another man who had
refunded the £5/10 bride-price, but did not return his two children.
In a 1919 suit,111 the plaintiff Amodu sued the defendant Aridegbe for a £12/10 loan that
had been raised by Aridegbe’s husband Ewetade on which Aridegbe had been the pawn and
Amodu had been the surety. Ewetade had borrowed £10/10 to pay the bride-price owed to
Aridegbe’s previous husband. Amodu had taken Ewetade to his village, but Ewetade then fell
ill. After “much begging,” Aridegbe told the court that she had agreed to serve in his place for
five months. After a year, she “got tired of it and left to have another husband,” who had since
returned the dowry owed to Ewetade through the Itoko chiefs. She had a child for her previous
husband, and had left the child with Ewetade. Amodu and Ewetade together pawned the child,
when her previous husband intervened and sued successfully for custody. Despite the fact that
Aridegbe was able to leave her husband when a better opportunity arose, according to her own
account her labor and reproductive powers were manipulated by men.
103McIntosh (2009), p. 84.
104Byfield (1996), p. 34.
105Byfield (1996), p. 42-43.
106Hopkins (1969), p. 80.
107Folarin (1939, p. 18-20) divides the payments before marriage as follows: first, Baba gbo or Iya gbo, 22s and two
bottles gin; second, Ijohun, £3; third, Idana, £5/10 to £10/10, Ipalemo, £2/10 or more, and; fourth, Idamolidi
Ifa, £2 to £2/10. Together, these constituted Owo Ife, though in some cases a lump sum of “£10 to £15 or more”
could be paid.
108Lloyd (1968), p. 70.
109McIntosh (2009), p. 103.
110Header information is missing; plaintiff’s statement recorded on p. 436 of Ake “A” Civil Judgment Book Vol.
27, 1918-1919.
111Ake “A” Civil Suit 177/1919
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Junior wives were expected to work for senior wives, and all wives were obligated to help their
husbands’ other male relatives.112 Women did the bulk of “domestic” labor – cooking, cleaning
and caring for younger children.113 Since a man’s obligations were to his parents and siblings,
wives were responsible for their children’s resources.114 Women did not traditionally take part
in clearing, planting,115 or sowing, but did prepare food on the farm for men and assisted in
the harvest.116 Processing crops was women’s work. Campbell (1861, p. 51-52) described the
arduous process of turning palm fruits into oil and kernels. In return for their labor, women
would retain the palm kernels, while the revenue they earned selling oil was the property of their
husbands.117
Marriage was polygynous. Stone (1900, p. 99-100) reported that a “man’s position and
importance here are estimated by the number of his wives and the men seem willing to make
almost any sacrifice for a little fictitious notoriety.” Partridge (1911, p. 427) estimated that in
the past a “man in good position” would have as many as two hundred wives, though when
he wrote thirty was the most that a man might have. The important chiefs, impoverished by
their loss of position and “supply of free labor,” rarely had more than ten. Byfield (2002, p. 65)
argues that the cocoa boom at the turn of the century increased the demand for labor, creating
a “rush to get wives.”
The marriages of slave wives, pawned girls, and kinless women were different.118 Folarin
(1939, p. 9) reported that if a pawnee wished to marry a female pawn, the “proper course” was
to pay bride-price to her family; if she were “defiled” by him, the pawn money would be forfeited.
A 1910 report argued that it had been common to purchase slaves as wives during the Yoruba
wars.119 While Folarin (1939, p. 13) suggests that a female slave who married her master thereby
freed herself and her children, McIntosh (2009, p. 85, 114-115) provides examples of Egba women
who did not become free or receive any better treatment. Two wives of the Jaguna Ogunbiyi
fled to Lagos in 1869, seeking asylum.120 In a 1918 case, the defendant claimed a piece of
land through his grandmother, a slave wife of the plaintiff’s patriarch Afonja.121 She had been
redeemed by her family while pregnant, demonstrating that her productive and reproductive
capacities were valuable to both her husband’s lineage and her own kin.
Dependants were desirable before 1893 for both their labor services and the security they
provided. Fadipe (1970, p. 147) writes that each man “had the help of the dependent male
members of his family in tilling the field, planting crops, as well as reaping.” The EUG Secretary
testified to the WALC that “you would almost beg people to come live with you.”122 Immigrants,
112McIntosh (2009), p. 81, 88.
113McIntosh (2009), p. 111.
114McIntosh (2009), p. 112.
115McIntosh (2009, p. 120) writes, conversely, that they did help with extra labor in planting.
116Hopkins (1969), p. 82.
117Fadipe (1970), p. 151.
118McIntosh (2009), p. 85.
119Hopkins (1969), p. 82.
120Oroge (1975), p. 78.
121Ake “A” Civil Suit 419/1918.
122WALC (1916b), p. 453.
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he argued, were needed to protect settlements from outside raids, and so they could acquire land
for a “return payment, however small.”123 Accumulation of dependents did not end with the
Yoruba wars. In a 1915 suit, the defendant Abogurin had been brought to the plaintiff Akide
around 1904 by a mutual acquaintance, and asked for land.124 Akide told the court that “I
agreed as I want good people about me,” and made similar grants to nine other individuals. A
“stranger” of this sort lived under the protection of the family head; “it [was] his duty to rejoice
with them in their happiness and sympathize with them in their sorrow.”125 He was expected
to offer “voluntary” service in the form of two or three days of labour annually.126 He was also
to give presents at annual festivals and make contributions towards family funeral expenses.127
Elders and the olorogun (war chiefs) had an advantage in attracting – or compelling – de-
pendents, which explains why Townsend noted that it was the chiefs who were “turning to
agriculture” by experimenting with crops such as cotton. One, he noted, “farms a large piece
of ground and is reputed to be sufficiently well off.”128 Ogundipe, the plaintiff’s witness in a
1919 suit,129 told the court that their uncle Kute, “being older than us all he insisted that pltf
[plaintiff] was to come + live in his village.” Burton (1863, p. 144) described Okukenu as “rich
in land and slaves.” In a 1917 case, the defendant Alaji of Ikeredu claimed that his father was
a slave who redeemed himself but chose to remain with his master until his master attempted
to sell him to pay off his debts; he approached the Balogun of Ikereku, who gave him a site on
which to build a house.130
A variety of institutions existed, then, enabling the Egba to cope with chronic labor scarcity,
and so the supply and demand for labor were resolved through competition for rights over
persons. While those with only their labor power to offer were compelled to rely on reciprocal
work arrangements, individuals with economic and social capital or means of coercion could
access the labor power of slaves, pawns, wives, sons, kin, and dependents.
6. Capital
Binswanger and McIntire (1987, p. 78) argue that creditors will be wary to lend under land
abundance; land that has little value cannot serve as collateral. Livestock, prone to disease and
theft, is a poor substitute for land as collateral (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986, p. 517).
Without land tenancy, interlinked credit cannot overcome information problems (Binswanger
et al., 1989, p. 135). Simple technology and the thin hiring market similarly constrain the
credit market from the demand side (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987, p. 78). In Egba society,
the inability to use land as collateral made borrowing difficult, and this section describes the
credit institutions that did exist. Most important of these was the system of iwofa, or human
pawning. Next, this section discusses the difficulties Europeans faced advancing credit to the
123WALC (1916a), p. 187.
124Abeokuta Civil Suit 905/1915
125Folarin (1939), p. 69.
126Hopkins (1969), p. 85.
127WALC (1916a), p. 187.
128CMS, CA2/O85 #11.
129Ake “A” Civil Suit 119/1919.
130Ake “A” Civil Suit 163/1917.
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Egba. Finally, it outlines the impact of the introduction of kola and cocoa on the credit market.
These made it possible to convert labor into fixed investment, and served as collateral.
6.1. Credit without collateral. A variety of institutions for borrowing existed other than
human pawning, though generally these were so unpleasant that the missionary Samuel Crowther
in comparison called pawning “a custom of relief.”131 Barber (1857, p. 109) states that farmers’
rotating credit societies prevented idleness, facilitated saving, and served as a form of insurance,
but does not suggest that they assisted the Egba to raise capital. Some 300 of these esusu clubs
operated in Abeokuta in 1861.132 Interest rates on cash loans were very high. Folarin (1939,
p. 58) describes an hypothetical loan of 20,000 cowries, on which 200 cowries would be charged
as interest every market day, totalling 40,000 over the course of a year.133 Barber (1857, p. 116)
describes one communicant who owed roughly 16s 8d to a creditor, onto which 5d interest was
added every 9 days; this would total 62% over the course of the year. A colonial official during
the 1920s noted that the rich at Owode had invested in receiving farms on pawn, and received
30-60% interest, with 100% paid in the case of palms.134 In 1924, another official elsewhere in
Yoruba territory cited interest rates of 30-60% as typical.135
The methods of collecting debt made these loans particularly unattractive. These were re-
sorted to because land had no value as collateral, and there were few substitutes available.
Traders could be seized for the debts of a countryman and sold into slavery.136 Folarin (1939,
p. 60-61) lists four methods of recovery – ogo, edan, emu, and sale into slavery.137 If ogo was
used, a messenger, possibly a leper, was sent to the debtor’s house. He could eat his food, wear
his clothes, and “do all in his power to worry or irritate him.” If the edan, a ceremonial staff was
sent by the township authorities to the house of the borrower and payment was not immediately
forthcoming, the goods or persons in the house could be sold. Emu enabled a creditor of long
standing to recover his debts by seizing persons or property of the debtor, who was fined for
causing the authorities to become involved. The debtor himself could be sold into slavery on
application by to the ogboni (civil chiefs).
6.2. Human pawning. Iwofa (pawns) were those whose labor had been pledged for a debt.
Labor by the pawn was taken in lieu of interest until the principal was repaid. Pawnship
first appears in Egba oral histories in the settlement of Abeokuta, during which Egba pawned
themselves to Itoko and Ibara farmers to escape famine.138 In so far as the iwofa was a voluntary
transaction exchanging cash for labor, this is also consistent with the period of temporary
land scarcity shifting supply outwards in the labor market. In 1936, the Egba District Officer
131Oroge (2003), p. 337.
132McIntosh (2009), p. 133.
133He also gives the example of a loan of 12/6 with 5/6 interest charged after 7 months.
134NAI, CSO 26 24873 Assessment Report Owode District
135NAI, CSO 26 06827 Vol II “Pawning of Children,” 17 Oct, 1924: Resident Oyo to Secretary, Southern Provinces.
136Townsend (1845), p. 3.
137These are also discussed in Hopkins (1969, p. 91-92)
138Ajisafe (1924), p. 64.
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estimated that there were five thousand iwofa in the division.139 Richer men could acquire more
pawns; one informant claimed that his father had 60 working in his farms.140
Describing iwofa amongst the Yoruba in general, the Senior Resident at Oyo wrote in 1924
that the most common pawning contract was for a debt of £2/10 to £7/10. Critically, he noted
that “no one will lend money to a man under the above system unless the borrower is vouched
for and can find a surety who is responsible for the repayment of the loan.”141 The importance of
the guarantor, or onigbowo, is stressed by the proverb that “the iwofa suffers no inconvenience,
it is the guarantor who is inconvenienced.”142 The onigbowo was paid a fee of 6d, but became
responsible for repayment of the debt if the pawn died or absconded.143 The working of the
iwofa system depended, then, on a third party able to monitor and discipline the pawn. This is
again evidence of the monitoring costs that plagued the labor market.
Although colonial officials viewed iwofa as a voluntary act for adult men, with pawning
of children as an unacceptable form of disguised slavery,144 the Egba saw it primarily as one
involving children and dependents. The Alake volunteered the example of a son who pawned
himself to save the family head from the disgrace of being a debtor.145 Folarin (1939, p. 8-9)
stressed that “[a]ny person male or female may be pawned, whatever his age, by his parents or
relations.” One of my informants suggested that:
since am polygamist I was then free to take two of my children one from each
wives and then go to the money lender that I needed money and so take these
children of mine let them be with you to assist you with your work while you
borrow me money I will come for them in two or three season time since I did
not sell the children to him and by the that time I will also bring the money.146
An iwofa would serve the creditor “in any capacity agreed upon.”147 A pawn’s family could
negotiate with the creditor about how their relative was treated.148 Pawns were given a daily
assignment to complete, while slaves were used “to any extent.”149 They could refuse transport
work.150 An iwofa might work half-days, from 6AM until noon for the olowo (creditor),151 two
139NAI, Abe Prof 2 EDC 30 Iwofa: 12 Nov, 1936: District Officer Egba to Resident
140Interview: Chief J. Adeleye, 2 Sept, 2007.
141NAI, CSO 26 06827 Vol II ”Pawning of Children” 17 Oct, 1924: Resident Oyo to Secretary, Southern Provinces.
142Fadipe (1970), p. 191.
143Fadipe (1970), p. 191.
144Byfield (2003), p. 365.
145NAI, CSO 26/1 03063: Enactment of the Slavery Ordinance (1916); Nov 5, 1915: Secretary Egba Native
Authority to Commissioner.
146Interview: Chief T. Ojewumi.
147Folarin (1939), p. 8.
148Interview: R. A. Popoola, Sept 2, 2007
149Interview: I. A. Amosu, 27 July, 2007
150NAUK, CO 147/162: 20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain
151NAI, CSO 26/1 03063: Enactment of the Slavery Ordinance (1916): Short Memorandum on the Egba Native
Custom of Ofa (by A. Edun Oct 14, 1915).
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or three days during the week,152 nine days out of every eighteen,153 one hundred heaps in a
four day week,154 or one week in three.155
The institution of iwofa, then, provided a resolution to both labor and capital scarcity where
alternative forms of collateral were unavailable. Oroge (2003) argues that the most common
reasons that individuals were pawned in Yoruba society were sieges during war, for the welfare
of poor children (as the olowo was obligated to care for a child pawn), and the heavy expenses
incurred in religious obligations, funerals, marriages and court fines – i.e., for consumption loans.
Creditors preferred to receive the labor services of pawns over holding other assets on pawn.
There are a handful of cases in the court records in which palms were made part of a debt
contract only after an iwofa arrangement had broken down.156 In a 1915 suit, the plaintiff’s
brother had pawned himself to the defendant for £5.157 The defendant claimed that, as no
onigbowo could be found, he took over the farm and palms as surety when the iwofa refused to
serve him. Although he received repayment of the principal, he told the court that “the nuts I
reaped I took as my interest.”
6.3. European credit. Egba contact with European merchants did little to ameliorate these
conditions. Europeans were reticent to lend because of the risks involved. As early as 1863,
Europeans in Lagos complained that Africans could escape to Abeokuta, becoming “refugees
for debt.”158 In 1912, John Deemin wrote to Ayles, another merchant, that he had advanced
£3475 at Abeokuta, and after accusing his correspondent of giving loans to risky borrowers,
stated that it was “easy enough to give out credit, but a very difficult matter to get it paid.”159
The problem with the credit market was not the potential creditors, but the lack of collateral.
Together with Egba commercial interests, the European firms in Abeokuta and Lagos led an
unsuccessful campaign to make urban land attachable for trading debts. Here, the obstacle was
the combined policy of the colonial government and the EUG that foreigners were not to acquire
any permanent interests in land.160 A 1903 circular stipulated that lands and houses in Abeokuta
could not be sold or mortgaged to anyone not a native of Egbaland.161 This prohibition may
have been in force earlier; in a 1902 suit G.B. Ollivant & Co. attempted to attach Isaac Coker’s
houses and lands at Itesi for a debt; the court disallowed this, permitting them to send tappers
to work Coker’s rubber, but noting that “lands and houses are forbidden to be sold in all the
Egba United Government territories.”162
152Barber (1857), p. xvii.
153Folarin (1939), p. 9.
154Byfield (2003), p. 361.
155Johnson (1921), p. 127.
156See Abeokuta Civil Suit 631/1915 and Abeokuta Civil Suit 854/1915, or Ake “A” Civil Suit 196/1919 for
additional examples.
157Abeokuta Civil Suit 538/1915.
158NAUK, CO 147/4, 6 Nov, 1863: Glover to Newcastle.
159RHL, Mss Afr s 1657 John Deemin Papers, Deemin to Ayles, 17 Jan 1908
160For an analysis of the reasons for this policy, which appeared in various forms throughout West Africa, see
Phillips (1989).
161NAUK, CO 147/166, enc in 9 June, 1903: MacGregor to Chamberlain.
162NAA, ECR 2/1/3 Civil and Criminal Record Book No. III 1902-03, Suit 337: G.B. Ollivant & Co. v. Isaac
O. Coker
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The outcome of this inability to provide collateral on loans was perverse; by the early 1920s,
demolition of houses for sale as scrap had become widespread. Folarin (1931, p. 81) wrote in 1930
that “several houses in the town have been demolished and the town bore every appearance of
warlike devastation and desolation.” In 1922, a petition signed by ogboni (civil chiefs), olorogun
(war chiefs), parakoyi (trade chiefs), Christians, and Muslims was sent to the Alake and Council
asking for the ability to attach land for debt.163 The document carried 800 signatures.164 The
council was aware that the destruction of houses was “not good” and that the restrictions raised
interest rates, but still chose to take no action.165
6.4. Tree crops. Tree crops were one potential source of collateral. When palms, cocoa, or kola
were pawned, no interest was charged and use of the trees was turned over to the creditor until
the loan was repaid. In the sample of court records it is difficult to identify the specific terms
on which palms were pawned. The number of trees given over is only reported once – in a 1917
suit, the plaintiff claimed she had pawned twelve trees for one shilling each.166 Still, seventeen
clear examples of pawning of land with palm trees, without any other tree crops mentioned, and
in which the amount received is stated yield an average loan of a little over £6/10.167
Pawning palms to raise capital was, however, problematic. The estimate cited above that the
interest on palm trees at Owode was much higher than that on other loans suggests a substantial
risk premium. Further, the estimated profit of 26s on 24 bearing trees was similar to the rate of
1s per tree in a pawning contract, which encouraged borrowers to redeem their loans as quickly
as possible.168 Early repayment created risk; in a 1905 suit, the defendant refused to accept
sixteen bags of cowries as redemption because he had not had time to do more than clear the
land in the two years it had been in his possession.169 The fundamental difficulty, however, was
that palms were not scarce.
163Folarin (1931), p. 115-118.
164NAA, ECR 1/1/19 Egba Council Records Vol 1.
165NAA, ECR 1/1/19 Egba Council Records Vol 1.
166Ake “A” Civil Suit 719/1917.
167Abeokuta Civil Suit 693/1908, pawned for 40 bags of cowries or £10 to pay medical expenses; Abeokuta Civil
Suit 551/1915, pawned at Ilawo for £2/10 some time between 1875 and 1890 while the owner was away; Abeokuta
Civil Suit 556/1915 pawned more than seven years prior to the case for £2/10; Abeokuta Civil Suit 561/1915,
pawned at Igbo-Oya in 1897 for £10; Abeokuta Civil Suit 631/1915, pawned for £12/10 c. 1914 at Oluwo; Ake
Central Suit 548/1905, pawned for £5, Abeokuta Civil Suit 70/1911, pawned less than ten years ago for £2/10
by a man with no right to pawn it, Ake “A” Civil Suit 299/1917, pawned ten years prior for £5; Ake “A” Civil
Suit 352/1917, pawned six years earlier for £6 for after plaintiff’s mother died; Ake “A” Civil Suit 590/1917,
pawned 12 years earlier for £7/10; Ake “A” Civil Suit 124/1918, pawned for £3/10 a year before at Asaya; Ake
“A” Civil Suit 792/1917, pawned for £1/5 17 years and six months before at Olope; Ake “A” Civil Suit 225/1918,
pawned at Awowo four years earlier for £7/10; Ake “A” Civil Suit 31/1918, pawned at Agbadu in 1918 for £2/15
to pay damages in a trespass suit; Ake “A” Civil Suit 402/1918, pawned at Ibu four years previously for £3/15;
Ake “A” Civil Suit 875/1918, the palm trees alone pawned for £20 at Afojupa 10 years before; Ake “A” Civil
Suit 583/1918, pawned for £5 at Igboro 18 years earlier; Ake “A” Civil Suit 143/1919, pawned for the deceased’s
outstanding debts of £30/10 after his funeral 20 months earlier. In Ake “A” Civil Suit 130/1918, the defendant
claimed the farm at Etepo had been pawned to him for £22/10 a year before, but court was skeptical of the size
of the loan and his failure to use the plot for over seven months. This has not been included in the average.
168NAI, CSO 26 24873 Assessment Report Owode District.
169Ake Central Suit 174/1905.
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Cocoa and kola presented fewer difficulties, though much of the evidence that they were used
to raise capital comes from the period after 1914. Ward-Price (1939, p. 92) argued that the
pawning of cocoa farms was common. In neighboring Ibadan, Captain Ross reported in 1926
that a loan of £7 could be raised on 100 good cocoa trees – roughly 1/5 per tree.170 At Owode
during the 1920s, trees were typically pawned for 2/6 apiece.171 Seven cases in the records exist
in which land with cocoa and without palms being mentioned was pawned and the amount
stated in court; the average sum in these transactions is a little over £5/15.172 Each interviewee
agreed that individuals could use their cocoa farms as a source of credit. Investment of labor
in the creation of a cocoa farm established what Besley (1995) has called “Lockean” claims to
ownership.173 This reduced some of the uncertainties involved. Further, as a scarce asset with
a higher annual yield, cocoa was simply more valuable than palm trees. Finally, cocoa farms
could also be sold.
7. Conclusion
Over the course of the nineteenth century, Egba institutions over land, labor and capital
were decisively shaped by the availability of uncleared forest. The “price” of land was low, and
rights over it were often temporary and ill-defined. Wage labor was absent. Manpower was
recruited from slaves, dependents, and the other members of cooperative work groups. Capital
markets were thin, relying on human pawns. Further, these institutions responded to changes
in agricultural suitability and population pressure in ways that can be explained by the land
abundance view. Pressed into a small region of initial settlement, the Egba intensified their land
use, eventually developing the right to sell land. Cultivators defended their rights over especially
productive plots. Slaves were employed in export production by those who had the lowest costs
of acquiring them. The greater prominence of the war chiefs allowed them to accumulate large
numbers of wives. Tree crops, especially those that embodied labor as physical capital, improved
the functioning of credit markets. The Egba, then, underscore the ability of the “land abundance
view” to account for the evolution of economic institutions in pre-colonial Africa.
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Appendix A. Sample Case: Abeokuta Civil Suit 137/1909
[Page 504]
In the Native Court of Abeokuta Thursday the 4th day of March 1909 Before A.B. Green and
S.J. Peters, Judges.
137/09 Odunusi of Ake vs. Taiwo of Kemta
Recovery of farm land at Olugbo property of the pltff
Odunusi sworn on Bible states: I am of Ake am a Farmer - my father Durojaiye of Ake took
this farm at Olugbo in dispute as farm forest – after the Abo war – I accompanied my late father
there together, with my brother Fatoki and two pawn men of my father. Lukosi of Kemta father
of Deft Taiwo came to this farm 3 years after us, my late father Durojaiye gave portion him
Lukosi some portion of his own forest farm to work upon – One Daresu an elder brother of my
father Durojaiye had some forest farm Darun in his life time worked some portion of this and
died, this Darun’s portion both Irapa + forest was taken now by Deft Taiwo as farm belonging
to his late father Lukosi – Durojaiye and Darun were brothers of the same parents. Darun had
children as my self + Fatoki are sons of Durojaiye. The farms of Durojaiye and Darun are now
being claimed by Deft – which has no right to do.
Deft – Taiwo sworn on the Bible States: - I am of Kemta, am a farmer. One Ande of Kemta
took my father Lukosi of Kemta to this farm at Olugbo about the Abo war. Durojaiye father
of pltff first got to this farm, and first took his portion of forest, then my father took next then
Lukosi’s boys, about 13 boys then serving my late father in this farm. I never heard of the
name of Darun in this farm during the Ibadan warfare against the Egbas bother my father +
Durojaiye pltff’s father left this farm and never returned to the place till about 12 years ago
when my father’s people and pltff returned to the farm – but I did not for pltff laid hold of
his father’s farm and my father’s boys laid hold of my father’s. There is the Porogun trees
planted on the boundary of the farms of Durojaiye and Lukosi till today. It was the plaintiff
who trespassed on my father’s land. I never knew any farm belonging to Darun in this part.
For pltff Fatoki sworn on cutlass states: - I am of Ake, am an Ifa priest and son of Durojaiye.
Ande of Kemta and my father Durojaiye started at the same time for this farm region the same
day Ande took his portion and Durojaiye this portion side by side. My father Durojaiye first
got to this farm, three years after Lukosi father of Deft came, my father there gave him the
forest farm of one Sholoye which my father had taken for him and he never turned up. After
the warfare Lukosi people and my father’s people had to leave this farm. At the return Lukosi
people laid claim on our father’s farm . by trespassing over the boundary. I heard at a time the
Kemta planted Porogun trees on the boundary. Darun an elder brother of Durojaiye my father
had a farm, which is now being claimed by Deft in conjunction with Durojaiye’s.
Aboni sworn on Cutlass States: I am of Kemta. One Faroubi of Kemta took us to this farm.
We were there for good length of time before Durojaiye Father of pltff came. Durojaiye came
of himself but Ande of Kemta gave him forest. Lukosi father of Deft came two years after
Durojaiye, Lukosi took portion of farm Durojaiye had reserved for one of his people but it was
forest. The farm in dispute is part of Lukosi’s farm. Lukosi’s farm is in the middle of Durojaiye’s
farm and Igbonla – on the other side of Durojaiye is Ogunbiyi’s farm. At a time when there was
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a dispute of boundary between Lukosi and Durojaiye’s farm, the Kemta chiefs settled it then
by planting porogun trees. These trees are there till today.
For Deft Sanyaolu sworn on cutlass states: I am Kemta am a carver and a hunter. Ande of
Kemta was my grandfather who took Durojaiye father of pltff to this farm and allotted to him
portion of forest farm land. This Ande took Lukosi father of Deft to this farm Olugbo and gave
him forest farm. This was at the Ijaiye war. I was then present. I was as old as I am during the
Abo war of 1857.
I say the court after cross examination that I am telling a lie.
Case adjourned till Monday Mar-8-09
A.B. Green Pres.
Saml J. Peters
[Page 515]
In the Native Court of Abeokuta Monday the 8th day of March 1909 Before A.B. Green and
S.J. Peters Judges.
137/09 Oduwusi of Ake vs. Taiwo of Kemta
Recovery of farm land at Olugbo property of the pltff
Dagin sworn on cutlass states: I am of Kemta. I know the farm in dispute at Olugbo. The
farm was originally taken Lukosi of Kemta during the Abo war. I know that the farm was
originally taken by Lukosi because I accompanied them there 17 days after – Ande, Ogunbiyi
and Durojaiye father of pltff each took portion of this farm alongside one another. Ogunbiyi
was in the middle of these people. Durojaiye being on one side Likosi father of Deft is on the
right hand of Durojaiye, Lukosi gave his left to Igbo Inta. The land mark between Durojaiye
and Lukosi was made by planting Porogun trees by the Kemta people when there was difference
on this land at a time Durojaiye father of pltff had a farm there and Lukosi father of Deft also
had a farm.
Aruno sworn on cutlass states: I am of Kemta. I was slave of Lukosi father of Deft. This
farm was taken during the Abo war. I did not go with them but afterwards I went there after
two years Lukosi got there. Durojaiye was the first to get to this farm then Lukosi my master.
When Lukosi came he took the forest next to Durojaiye. Durojaiye never ran away from this
farm, but died.
Case adjourned till Wednesday when escort will be sent to this farm to see the porogun trees
planted by the Kemta people.
A.B. Green Pres.
Saml J. Peters
[Page 536]
Oseni sworn on the Koran states: I am police no. 29 EUG. I was sent by the court to the farm
in question at Olugbo. I summonsed the villagers. I found the two farms of pltff and deft side
by side. The boundary was marked by Porogun trees from one end to another, these porogun
trees were planted by Chiefs of Kemta, when there was a fight on this subject once. Pltff showed
me two porogun trees which one was in the middle of Defts farm, and one in some part of a road
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which he said was boundary. I found it was no boundary and the villagers said the same that
boundary is the straight demarcation in which porogun trees were planted straight from one end
to another. It was pltff who trespassed into Defts farm. The porogun trees in the boundary are
about 24. The poroguns are about 5 years old. The two poroguns pltf showed me were trees of
themselves of no object.
Judgment – Court decides that the boundary as marked by the 24 porogun trees planted by
the authorities of Kemta should from now be taken as boundary between the land farms of late
Durojaiye of Ake and Lukosi of Kemta. No notice should ever be taken of the two accidental
porogun trees pointed out by pltff. Judgment for Deft.
A.B. Green Pres.
Saml J. Peters.
